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Prayer as God-knowledge (via Self)
Abstract:What is the purpose of prayer? According to Kierkegaard, “prayer does
not change God, but it changes the one who prays.” Whilst much contemporary
philosophy of religion focuses on the so-called puzzle of petitionary prayer, less
is written about how prayer can change the person who prays. In this paper, I
discuss Kierkegaard’s account of prayer in The Sickness unto Death and “An Oc-
casional Discourse on the Occasion of Confession.” Prayer, as it is presented
here, allows a person to gain a certain kind of self-knowledge and thereby
draw near to God. After outlining Kierkegaard’s account, I draw some compari-
sons with Harry Frankfurt’s account of the will to demonstrate how prayer might
allow for both self-knowledge as well as God-knowledge.
I Introduction
Recent work on the philosophy of prayer has focused almost entirely on the
question of how a person’s prayer could change the mind of God. This is the
so called “puzzle of petitionary prayer.”¹ However, not all philosophers or theo-
logians agree that prayer should primarily seek to change the mind of God. The
Danish thinker Søren Kierkegaard, for instance, writes that “prayer does not
change God, but it changes the one who prays.”² This is a line of thought
which those who engage with the puzzle of petitionary prayer are familiar
with. Daniel and Frances Howard-Synder, for instance, state that,
[w]e agree that petitioning God can make a difference in us. However…most practicing
theists assume there is more to it than that and so it would be more charitable to solve
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the puzzle without denying their assumption. Moreover, even if petitioning God can make a
difference in us, we cannot petition him while thinking that our words won’t make any dif-
ference to whether he does what we ask.³
The Howard-Snyders acknowledge that the kind of thinking behind Kierke-
gaard’s view on prayer is valuable, but irrelevant to the puzzle of petitionary
prayer. Yet, in focusing only on the petitionary aspect of prayer, the philosophy
of Christian prayer risks becoming skewed in focus. Even if we disagree with
Kierkegaard’s conclusion (that prayer only changes us, and not God), the
question that seems pertinent to ask is: How does prayer change the person
who prays?
In this paper, I argue that the purpose of prayer is to gain knowledge of
oneself. However, this is not the kind of knowledge one can gain merely by in-
trospecting—the account of prayer I will focus on here aims to draw a person
closer to God through their knowledge of self. To do this, I focus on the short,
but intriguing, account of prayer that we find in Kierkegaard’s The Sickness
unto Death. Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous author, Anti-Climacus, writes, “to
pray is…to breathe, and possibility is for the self what oxygen is for
breathing.”⁴ What does Anti-Climacus mean by this remark? In presenting this
passage in the wider context of The Sickness unto Death, I argue that prayer as
it is presented here is best understood as an activity which enables a person
to gain a kind of self-knowledge. More specifically, in seeing what Anti-
Climacus writes about the human self as a synthesis of necessity and possibility,
we can see prayer as an activity of becoming more aware of our existence as
creatures who express both necessity (we are physical, mortal creatures) and
possibility (it is possible for us to somehow transcend this earthly life and the
constraints of everyday physical existence). After discussing Kierkegaard’s
account of prayer and self-knowledge in The Sickness unto Death, I draw a com-
parison between Kierkegaard’s Harry Frankfurt’s accounts of the will.⁵ Drawing
on Frankfurt’s notion of wholeheartedness, I describe the Kierkegaardian notion
of despair as a kind of internal conflict of the will which is irresolvable without
intervention from God; despair cannot be overcome, Anti-Climacus tells us, until
the soul “rests transparently in God.”⁶ To explain what generates this internal
conflict, I argue that all human beings have a first-order desire for union with
 Howard-Synder and Howard-Snyder, “The Puzzle of Petitionary Prayer,” p. 46.
 SKS 11, 156 / SUD, 40.
 Harry Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press 1988.
 SKS 11, 146 / SUD, 30.
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God which is often supressed, ignored, or misunderstood. It is only when this
desire for God is unified with a higher-order desire for union with God that a
person can be free of despair and come close to God. Thus, it follows, in order
for a person to come close to God in faith, she must become conscious of her
inherent desire for God. That is, prayer makes possible a kind of God-
knowledge via self-knowledge.⁷
II Kierkegaard on Prayer
Those familiar with Kierkegaard’s writings will know that they are littered with
short, and often profound, examples of prayers.⁸ Kierkegaard also offers some
thoughts on the purpose of prayer, at places in his writings. In his “Occasional
Discourse on the Occasion of Confession,” for instance, Kierkegaard discusses
an example of a confessional prayer. Kierkegaard writes that
[a] hasty explanation can suppose that to pray is a futile act because a person’s prayer does
not, of course, change the changeless; but in the long run would this be desirable, could
not the changing person easily come to repent that he managed to get God changed!
Thus, the true explanation is also the one and only to be desired: the prayer does not
change God, but it changes the one who prays.⁹
According to Kierkegaard, to pray is not to seek to change God’s mind, or at least
not in the context of a confession, but rather, to pray is to seek to change oneself.
Whilst it appears that Kierkegaard seeks to disregard petitionary prayer altogeth-
 Some points of clarification: First, this paper is not an attempt to offer a solution to the
problem of petitionary prayer. The claim that prayer primarily changes us and not God is not
a satisfying response to the problem of petitionary prayer, yet this does not mean that prayer
as a means of self-knowledge is without philosophical interest (although this may explain the
lack of exploration of this kind of prayer by analytic philosophers). Secondly, there is much
to be said on Kierkegaard’s discussion of self-knowledge (for discussions of Kierkegaard and
self-knowledge, see John Lippitt’s “Self-Knowledge in Kierkegaard,” in Self-Knowledge, ed. by
Ursula Renz, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2016; or Daniel Watts’s “Kierkegaard and the
Search for Self‐Knowledge,” European Journal of Philosophy, vol. 4, 2013, pp. 525–549). There
is not scope for a broad overview of what Kierkegaard writes on self-knowledge here. My
focus will primarily be to give an account of prayer which draws on aspects of Kierkegaard’s
thinking, rather than to offer a systematic overview of Kierkegaard’s thoughts on the topics of
either self-knowledge or prayer.
 These are compiled in The Prayers of Kierkegaard, ed. by Perry D. Le Fevre, Chicago: The Uni-
versity of Chicago Press 1956.
 SKS 8, 137 / UD, 22.
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er here, we need not reach such a drastic conclusion to follow Kierkegaard’s
thoughts on prayer. As the Howard-Snyders acknowledge, it is entirely
possible for prayer to change both the individual and God. The question that I
am interested in exploring here concerns what difference prayer makes to the
pray-er.
What is the nature of this change? In the context of the discourse, we find
this discussion of confessional prayer alongside Kierkegaard’s discussion of
the human will. Kierkegaard describes faith as a kind of single-mindedness in
which an individual has the purity of heart to will only the good. And it is
this purity of heart and single-mindedness of the will which allows a person
to draw near to God. Kierkegaard writes that “only the pure in heart are able
to see God and consequently keep near to him.”¹⁰ When Kierkegaard speaks
of “nearness” to God or “distance” from God, we should read this in terms of
willed distance from God. Although God never distances himself from us, the
result of despair and sin is a willed distance from God—human beings choose
to be far from God by lacking a purity of heart to will the good.
Conversely, it is a person’s lack of ability to will only the good, or their being
in a state of sin, which means that they will not to come near to God. Sin, as it is
discussed here, is a kind of despair in which a person has two wills;¹¹ although a
person wills the good and wills to be close to God, she is double-minded or con-
flicted in her will. For instance, she might pursue the good for some selfish
purpose such as for some reward,¹² or fear of punishment.¹³ Or, Kierkegaard
tells us, a person can be double-minded by only partially willing the good
through busyness or distraction.¹⁴ Hence, the prayer of confession seeks to
change a person by a change of the will. Prayer then seeks to bring about a
change from double-mindedness to single-mindedness in a person.
This discussion of prayer as a response to double-mindedness is picked up
two years later by Kierkegaard in the pseudonymously signed The Sickness unto
Death. Here, the author, Anti-Climacus, develops a similar account of faith, sin,
and despair, albeit in more philosophical terms. According to Anti-Climacus, the
universal human condition is that of despair. Despair, as it is defined in Sickness,
is a wilful misrelation to oneself. Either through ignorance, weakness, or
defiance, a person can be in a state of despair by failing to will to be a self in
the appropriate way. Anti-Climacus defines the self as a “synthesis of the
 SKS 8, 138 / UD, 24.
 SKS 8, 144 / UD, 30.
 SKS 8, 152 / UD, 41.
 SKS 8, 156 / UD, 44.
 SKS 8, 72 / UD, 64.
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infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity,
in short, a synthesis.”¹⁵ As Murray Rae describes it, this is an attempt to maintain
the tension which is found in the biblical view of the self; human beings are but
dust (Gen 3:19), yet, they “have been made a little lower than God” (Ps 8:5).¹⁶
Despair is a failure of the will in relation to the self. As it is described later in
Sickness, it is the basis of human sin. The kind of despair Anti-Climacus has in
mind is summarised well by the words of the Anglican confession: “Father…we
have sinned against you… through ignorance, through weakness, through our
own deliberate fault.”¹⁷ A person can express despair because of their lack of
self-awareness, through a kind of weakness of will or through a kind of
defiance. Hence, despair is closely related to a person’s self-knowledge. Anti-
Climacus writes that “[t]he more consciousness, the more self; the more con-
sciousness, the more will; the more will, the more self. A person who has no
will is not a self; but the more will he has, the more self-consciousness he has
also.”¹⁸ Thus, despair is a kind of internal conflict of a person’s will in which
she cannot or refuses to will to be a self.
The discussion of the will in Sickness is related to that in the “Occasional
Discourse.” Here Kierkegaard describes the sin of double-mindedness as a
kind of despair (“what else is it to despair but to have two wills!”¹⁹) Despair
as a wilful misrelation to oneself (e.g., to despair through a lack of possibility)
can be understood in terms of double-mindedness too. As Anti-Climacus repeat-
edly emphasises, what the person in despair lacks is the condition of faith in
which a person is free from despair and can relate properly to God. Anti-
Climacus explicitly calls the condition “the good”²⁰ in places. If despair is a frag-
mentation of the will in which there is conflict, faith is the antidote to this
conflict; faith is characterized by resting in God and willing only the good.
One of the key ways a person can exist in despair is by failing to exist as a
synthesis in the manner which Anti-Climacus is vital for existing as a self. Since
a person is a synthesis of necessity and possibility, a person can fall into despair
because they lack either necessity or possibility in how they live. For instance,
the despair of possibility is characterised by someone who lives a fantastical
life full of imagination, hopes and dreams but who never sees these dreams ac-
 SKS 11, 129 / SUD, 13.
 Murray Rae, Kierkegaard and Theology, Edinburgh: T&T Clark 2010, p. 92.
 Church of England, “A Form of Preparation,” in Common Worship, from: https://www.
churchofengland.org/prayer-worship/worship/texts.aspx [last accessed July 2016].
 SKS 11, 145 / SUD, 29.
 SKS 8, 144 / UD, 30.
 SKS 11, 213 / SUD, 101.
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tualized. “What is missing” from such a life, Anti-Climacus tells us “is essential-
ly the power to obey, to submit to one’s limitations.”²¹ Although it is vital that a
person expresses possibility in how they live, without expressing necessity, a
person is not fully a self, and thus exists in despair, according to Anti-
Climacus. He writes that “[p]ossibility is like a child’s invitation to a party; the
child is willing at once, but the question now is whether the parents will give
permission—and as it is with the parents, so it is with necessity.”²² Conversely,
just as a person falls into despair through possibility alone, a person who
exists only through necessity also exists in despair. Such a condition, Anti-
Climacus compares to a kind of “fatalism.”²³ To despair by lacking possibility
is to submit oneself to the facts of one’s situation—although one cannot exist
by expressing only the possible, to exist without any possibility is resign
oneself to the inevitably and uncontrollability of the future. Crucially, what the
fatalist lacks is the possibility of faith. From the perspective of the fatalist,
salvation is impossible and human beings are condemned to despair. Anti-
Climacus states that “[t]he believer has the ever infallible antidote for despair
—possibility—because for God everything is possible at every moment. This is
the good health of faith.”²⁴ Faith is presented as the antidote to the condition
of despair—if there is God for whom all things are possible, fatalism is false.
It is against this backdrop that we find Anti-Climacus account of prayer. He
tells us that
[t]he fatalist is in despair, has lost God and thus his self, for he who does not have a God
does not have a self, either. But the fatalist has no God, or, what amounts to the same thing,
his God is necessity; since everything is possible for God, then God is this—that everything
is possible. Therefore the fatalist’s worship of God is at most an interjection, and essentially
it is a muteness, a mute capitulation: he is unable to pray. To pray is also to breathe, and
possibility is for the self what oxygen is for breathing. Nevertheless, possibility alone or
necessity alone can no more be the condition for breathing of prayer than oxygen alone
or nitrogen alone can be that for breathing. For to pray there must be a God, a self—and
possibility—or a self and possibility in a pregnant sense, because the being of God
means that everything is possible, or that everything is possible means the being of
God…That God’s will is the possible makes me able to pray, if there is nothing but
necessity, man is essentially as inarticulate as the animals.²⁵
 SKS 11, 152 / SUD, 36.
 SKS 11, 152 / SUD, 37.
 SKS 11, 155 / SUD, 40.
 SKS 11, 155 / SUD, 39–40.
 SKS 11, 155– 156 / SUD, 40–41.
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The fatalist is in despair since he lacks possibility. The analogy that is used here
is of breathing—possibility provides oxygen for an individual, yet a person
cannot exist by only breathing oxygen. The fatalist lacks the ability to pray
because to pray is to relate to a God for whom all things are possible, not
least is the possibility of one’s own salvation. Prayer, as it is presented here
requires a basic level of self-awareness—remember, despair is a condition of a
person’s will and the fatalist, through ignorance, defiance, or weakness is
unable to pray since he is unable to express possibility.
Not only does prayer require a level of self-knowledge but also it brings with
it a kind of self-knowledge. The human self, in Anti-Climacus’s presentation, is
not static but something which requires a perpetual act of the will. Thus, to exist
as a synthesis of necessity and possibility requires a kind of breathing—a person
must be constantly breathing in possibility in Anti-Climacus’s metaphor.²⁶ The
implication of this analogy is that prayer allows a person to become more
self-aware. Prayer is a perpetual reminder that for God all things are possible.
Furthermore, since the human self is a synthesis of necessity and possibility,
by relating to God as the source of possibility, one comes to be aware that she
does not exist as a purely necessary being.
As with the discussion of prayer in the occasional discourse, Anti-Climacus
describes prayer as something which brings about change in the individual; this
is a change in a person’s self-awareness. Prayer brings home this fact that I am a
synthesis of the necessary and the possible—I exist as a mortal, physical thing
who is condemned to despair, yet I breathe in the possibility of faith, that for
God all things are possible. Or, to put it more simply, prayer allows a person
to gain knowledge of themselves. We also find this claim about self-knowledge
and prayer in “Occasional Discourse.” Kierkegaard writes:
The person confessing is not like someone confiding in a friend, whom he initiates, in
advance or afterward, into something he did not know before; the Omniscient One does
not find out anything about the person confessing, but instead the person confessing
finds out something about himself. Therefore, do not raise the objection against the confes-
sion that there is no benefit in confiding to an omniscient one what he already knows; first
answer the question whether it does not benefit a person to find out something about
himself that he did not know!²⁷
We can see more clearly that the change brought about through prayer (from
double-mindedness to single-mindedness) is a change of knowledge. A person
 This is one way of interpreting St. Paul’s command to “pray continually” (cf. 1 Thess 5:17).
 SKS 8, 137 / UD, 22.
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comes to know something through the act of praying. According to Kierkegaard,
the practice of prayer draws a person before God to reflect on their sin; if the
fatalist were more self-conscious, he would realise that he is not merely a
necessary, physical being, but rather, he relates to a God for whom all things
are possible. Not only this, but also the fatalist cannot draw near to God
because of his sin. The revelation of God through prayer brings home the fact
that a person is in despair and in despair a person cannot relate to God in
faith. For Kierkegaard, self-knowledge is an essential part of our coming to
know God. In a journal entry, he puts it as follows:
Paganism required: Know yourself. Christianity declares: No, that is provisional, know
yourself and then look at yourself in the Mirror of the Word in order to know yourself
properly. No true self-knowledge without God-knowledge or [without standing] before
God. To stand before the Mirror means to stand before God. ²⁸
Prayer as self-knowledge is only half of the picture, for Kierkegaard. True self-
knowledge must not only relate to the self, but must also relate to God. As
Anti-Climacus writes, “[t]he human self is such a derived, established relation
that relates itself to itself and in relating itself to itself relates itself to
another.”²⁹ To will only the good, a person must come to will to be in union
with God. And thus, a person can only single-mindedly will the good when
they are able to “rest transparently in God.”³⁰
III Wholeheartedness
Kierkegaard’s model of prayer as a means of coming to know God (via self) is
promising as a model of prayer. In the remainder of this paper, I will develop
this account of prayer by drawing on Harry Frankfurt’s analysis of the will to
try and further shed light on how prayer can bring about self-knowledge and
 SKS 24, 425, NB24:159 / JP 4, 3902.
 SKS 11, 129 / SUD, 13– 14.
 SKS 11, 146 / SUD, 30. The idea that knowledge of self is important for knowledge of God has
some precedence in the spiritual/theological literature: “[F]irst flows self-knowledge and from
this source arises knowledge of God” (John of the Cross, Dark Night of the Soul, trans. by
Mirabai Starrm, New York: Riverhead Books, 2002, pp. 78–79.) See also John Calvin: “Nearly
all the wisdom which we possess, that is to say, true and sound wisdom, consists of two
parts: the knowledge of God and of ourselves. But, while joined by many bonds, which one
precedes and brings forth the other is not easy to discern.” (John Calvin, Institutes of the
Christian Religion, abridged version, London/Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, p. 1.)
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why this might in turn allow for an increased knowledge of God. Similarly to
Anti-Climacus, Frankfurt states that the human will has an essential role to
play in our understanding of personhood.³¹ He writes,
[i]t is my view the one essential difference between persons and other creatures is to be
found in the structure of a person’s will. Human beings are not alone in having desires
and motivations, or in making choices. They share these things with the members of
certain other species, some of whom appear to engage in deliberation and to make
decisions based upon prior thought. It seems to be peculiarly characteristic of humans,
however, that they are able to form what I shall call “second order desires.”³²
For Frankfurt, to will is to be able to form second-order desires.³³ The difference
between first-order and second-order desires, as Frankfurt defines it, is that first-
order desires are desires “to do or not to do one thing or another,”³⁴ whereas
second-order desires are desires which are directed towards first-order desires.
A second-order desire is a desire to desire something. An example will help to
make this clearer. I may have the first-order desire to gorge myself on
chocolate every night and I might also have the first order desire not to get
too fat. I might also have certain second-order desires: the desire not to desire
chocolate so often, or a desire to have a greater desire to not get too fat, for
example. Now, the will, in Frankfurt’s terminology is simply “an effective
desire—one that moves (or will or would move) a person all the way to
action.”³⁵ Willing differs from intending, for instance, in that “even though
someone may have a settled intention to do X, he may nonetheless do
something else instead of doing X because, despite his intention, his desire to
do X proves to be weaker or less effective than some conflicting desire.”³⁶
Thus, I may fail to will to desire less chocolate if my second-order desire to
desire less chocolate fails to be effective. That is, if I want my desire for self-
control to trump my desire for delicious chocolate, and I eat the delicious
 I appreciate that “selfhood” in Anti-Climacus’s account and “personhood” in Frankfurt’s
discussion might not be equivalent, but, as we will see, there is sufficient similarity in what
these two accounts are interested in describing that the application of Frankfurt’s account of
the will is still a helpful comparison to make.
 Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About, p. 12.
 Note the similarity here with what Anti-Climacus has to say: “[t]he possibility of this sickness
[despair] is man’s superiority over the animal” (SKS 11, 131 / SUD, 15). Or, in other words, the
capacity to will, or more precisely, a failure to will, distinguishes human beings from other
animals.
 Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About, p. 12.
 Ibid., p. 14.
 Ibid., p. 14.
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chocolate, I have failed to will effectively. This kind of second-order desire, in
which a person wants a desire to be his will, is what Frankfurt calls a “second
order volition.”³⁷
Just as we found in Kierkegaard’s writings, Frankfurt argues that the human
will can be distorted or in conflict in various ways. On Frankfurt’s account, a
person has a hierarchy of desires; some of our desires play a more crucial role
than others, and some of our less important desires are subordinate to more
important desires. My desire to be a morally good person, for instance, trumps
my desires for having as much fun as possible. Thus, when my desire for
having fun conflicts with my desire for moral goodness, I desire to have the
second-order volition to will the right action, and not the most fun action.
Because of the possibility of having hierarchy and structure in our desires, it
is possible to lack what Frankfurt calls “wholeheartedness” (Kierkegaard’s
term “double-mindedness” looks just as appropriate here) when our internal
desires conflict in some way.³⁸ In such a case, Frankfurt remarks,
[i]t is not a matter of volitional strength but of whether the highest-order preferences con-
cerning some volitional issue are wholehearted. It has to do with the possibility that there is
no unequivocal answer to the question of what the person really wants, even though his
desires do form a complex and extensive hierarchical structure. There might be no unequi-
vocal answer, because the person is ambivalent with respect to the object he comes closest
to really wanting: In other words, because with respect to that object, he is drawn not only
toward it but away from it too. Or there might be no unequivocal answer because the
person’s preferences concerning what he wants are not fully integrated, so that there is
some inconsistency or conflict (perhaps not yet manifest) among them.³⁹
Wholeheartedness is a structural property of one’s will in which a person has a
freedom of will because their desires are integrated in the appropriate way. That
 Ibid., p. 16.
 Rudd makes this comparison between single-mindedness and wholeheartedness. He notes
that contrary to Frankfurt’s subjective understanding of wholeheartedness, for Kierkegaard,
“only the Good can be willed wholeheartedly” (Antony Rudd, “Kierkegaard’s Platonism and
the Reasons of Love,” in Love, Reason and Will: Kierkegaard after Frankfurt, ed. by Antony
Rudd and John Davenport, New York and London: Bloomsbury 2015, p 254).
 Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About, p. 165. This kind of conflict of the will can
also occur because of a kind of ignorance towards one’s desires, according to Frankfurt: “It is
possible for a human being to be at times, and perhaps even always, indifferent towards his
own motives—to take no evaluative attitude toward the desires that incline him to act. If
there is a conflict between those desires, he does not care which of them proves to be more
effective. In other words, the individual does not participate in the conflict. Therefore, the
outcome of the conflict can be neither a victory for him nor a defeat.” (Frankfurt, The Importance
of What We Care About, p. 164.)
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is, there is nothing internally about a person’s desires or volitions which is pre-
venting them from willing in a certain way.
This analysis can easily be extended to think about the conflict of will we
find in Kierkegaard’s analysis of double-mindedness and despair. Understood
in these terms, Kierkegaard’s notion of despair is a condition of lacking whole-
heartedness, of not being able to will effectively. In particular, despair is the
condition of failing to will only the good because of the conflict of one’s will
due to a lack of wholeheartedness or internal fragmentation. However,
whereas Frankfurt’s notion of wholeheartedness is a structural property of the
will, for Kierkegaard, there is something more objective about single-minded-
ness.⁴⁰ Kierkegaard’s account of single-mindedness, in contrast to Frankfurt’s,
depends not only on the structure of a person’s will, but also on whether or
not that person wills the good. And unlike Frankfurt, Kierkegaard has a clear
idea of how a person’s will needs to be integrated in order to be wholehearted.
As both Kierkegaard and Anti-Climacus describe it, human beings are unable to
be content until they “rest transparently in God”⁴¹ or “will only the good.”⁴² As
Anthony Rudd describes, for Kierkegaard,
[o]n the…Kierkegaardian view…I need to appeal to standards outside of me—to the True
and the Good—and if I find I am averse to them, then this is not something to be
accepted, but to be struggled against. If there is a genuinely authoritative standard, then
choices made with reference to that standard are not arbitrary. This can I think, help us
to see the force of Kierkegaard’s claim that it is only through being orientated to God
that the self is able to hold together the elements of transcendence and immanence in
creative tension, and that the loss of that orientation necessarily results in the internal
conflict, or self-mutilation that Kierkegaard calls ‘despair’ or ‘sin’. At any rate, we can
see why it seem plausible to claim that the self needs an orientation to the Good to
prevent it from despairing in this sense.⁴³
 Frankfurt’s account of wholeheartedness is susceptible to the following kind of counter
examples: “Eve is a strong, independent young woman. She longs for an education and
career of her own. Unfortunately, she has been born into a strict, religious community. In that
community, women are expected to be meek and compliant, to accept male authority, to
remain uneducated, and maintain a subservient societal role. Eve rejects those values and
insists that she be respected as fully equal to anyone else. But after years of failure, condemna-
tion, and psychological and physical abuse, she breaks down. She starts to accept the subser-
vient role. She becomes a willing convert.” (Bruce N. Waller, Against Moral Responsibility,
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 2011, p. 61.)
 SKS 11, 146 / SUD, 30.
 SKS 8, 138 / UD, 24.
 Rudd, “Kierkegaard’s Platonism and the Reasons of Love,” pp. 258–59.
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In order to make sense of this account in Frankfurtian terms, then,we must claim
that human beings have an inherent first-order desire for the good which will
always conflict with one’s other desires until one becomes wholehearted. If
one can only be content by resting transparently in God, then one way of
making sense of this is that resting transparently in God satisfies a certain
desire, even if one was unaware of this desire. It is only when one is able to
have an effective second-order volition to will the good that a person’s desires
become structured in such a way that there is no conflict.
IV Prayer as God-knowledge (via Self)
The implication of the Kierkegaardian/Frankfurtian account of the will I have
been considering is that it is only by submitting to the will of God that a
person be truly free and wholehearted. The ultimate good for human beings,
as we have seen, Anti-Climacus repeatedly emphasise, is to “rest transparently
in God.”⁴⁴ If it is true that human beings possess an inherent desire for God
which must be integrated around a higher-order desire for goodness, then the
more self-aware one becomes, the more one realises that the only way of
unifying one’s desires and will is by coming closer to God.
This account of wholeheartedness can help us to see how Christian faith and
sin are related to the will in more precise terms. The result of human sin is that
human beings lack the resources to come into union with God, since their desires
are not aimed at the good. They fail to will to be a self since they lack the higher-
order desire which can fully integrate their will. For Anti-Climacus, faith is a gift
from God which provides the antidote to despair. We can understand this in
Frankfurtian terms: faith is the reception of the higher-order desire to will the
good, around which all of a person’s desires can be integrated. The life of
faith, then, is a life of reintegration of a person’s desires and will so that, even-
tually, they may be wholehearted in their desire for the good.⁴⁵ The practice of
prayer can be seen as a crucial part of this process of reintegration. For the
person who has received the gift of faith and the higher-order desire for the
good, the purpose of prayer is to become more self-aware, to discover where
one’s desires are not unified around the good, and where one is not single-
minded.
 SKS 11, 146 / SUD, 30.
 Eleonore Stump also draws on Frankfurt’s analysis of higher-order desires to explain her
Thomistic view of the ordo salutis; cf. Eleonore Stump,Wandering Darkness, Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press 2010.
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How is it possible for prayer to bring a person out of despair and eventually
closer to God? John Lippitt, in his discussion of Kierkegaard’s account of self-
knowledge, describes a person’s self-knowledge in first person, third person
and second personal terms. He writes that self-knowledge seeks “to understand
sin as an objective property in which all humanity is implicated, but to relate to
this on a first-person, subjective level as something that applies to me. Standing
‘before God’ (second-person) is what brings this home.”⁴⁶ As Lippitt reads Kier-
kegaard’s discussion of self-knowledge, true self-knowledge requires us to come
close to God and it is in this encounter with God that a person comes to realise
the extent of their sin and their distance from God. To continue the application of
Frankfurt’s terminology—by experiencing God in prayer, a person comes to
realise that they have a deep-seated desire for union with God and that this
conflicts with their other desires. Furthermore, this conflict (or despair) is the
very thing which prevents this person from enjoying a closeness in relationship
to God. Only through a purity of the will can a person come to know God, but in
experiencing God, a person comes to realise that their will is too fragmented to
wholeheartedly will to be in union. It is this realisation that my desire and my
will prevent me from the one thing that can bring wholeheartedness, that I
can begin the process of reintegration. The key difference between the kind of
self-knowledge made possible in prayer, and all other kinds of introspection
or self-knowledge, then, is that prayer begins before God and the content of
self-knowledge relates to a person’s will and desires.
As Eleonore Stump argues, in order for persons to be close to one another,
there has to be a mutual self-revelation in which both person’s share their
thoughts and feeling freely.⁴⁷ However, if a person is fragmented because of a
lack of wholeheartedness, then this precludes the possibility of personal
closeness:
A person alienated from himself cannot have someone else close to him. Jerome cannot
reveal his mind to Paula if Jerome has hidden a good part of his mind from himself.
And, if Jerome desires not to have the desires he has with regard to Paula, then to that
extent he does not desire closeness with Paula either. For that matter, if Jerome is
divided within himself as regards any of his desires, Paula will be distant from some
part of Jerome, no matter which of his conflicting desires she allies herself with. So, for
Paula to be close to Jerome, it is necessary that Jerome be integrated in himself.⁴⁸
 John Lippitt, “Self-knowledge in Kierkegaard,” p. 16.
 Stump, Wandering in Darkness, p. 120.
 Stump, Wandering in Darkness, p. 125.
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Stump’s account of personal closeness can be extended to think about closeness
with God. Anti-Climacus writes that Christianity teaches that a person is “invited
to live on the most intimate terms with God”;⁴⁹ we can see despair as a kind of
fragmentation that prevents this kind of intimacy from occurring. In short, those
living in a state of despair, or double-mindedness, are not able to be close to God
because there are parts of themselves which are hidden even to their own con-
sciousness. Thus, when Anti-Climacus describes prayer as a breathing of
necessity and possibility, we can see this as a kind of re-orientation of the self
in which a person comes to recognise their own fragmentation (either they
lean too heavily towards necessity or too heavily towards possibility).
The crucial feature of this account of prayer, is that this realisation occurs
when one is before God. For the fatalist, coming before God brings with it the
realisation that everything is possible for God, and thus, it is her own despair
which prevents her from drawing near to God as a synthesis of necessity and
possibility. Self-awareness is essential for the possibility of being near to God.
As we have seen, the practice of prayer makes possible a kind of self-
knowledge through the experience of being before God. In turn, this self-
knowledge allows a person to realign their will in the appropriate way, and
thus, to draw close to God.
 SKS 11, 199 / SUD, 85.
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